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Abstract— We present a design for a quantum key distribution
(QKD) system in a Sagnac loop configuration, employing a
novel phase modulation scheme based on frequency shift, and
demonstrate stable BB84 QKD operation with high interference
visibility and low quantum bit error rate (QBER). The phase
modulation is achieved by sending two light pulses with a fixed
time delay (or a fixed optical path delay) through a frequency
shift element and by modulating the amount of frequency shift.
The relative phase between two light pulses upon leaving the
frequency-shift element is determined by both the time delay
(or the optical path delay) and the frequency shift, and can
therefore be controlled by varying the amount of frequency
shift. To demonstrate its operation, we used an acousto-optic
modulator (AOM) as the frequency-shift element, and vary the
driving frequency of the AOM to encode phase information.
The interference visibility for a 40km and a 10km fiber loop is
96% and 99%, respectively, at single photon level. We ran BB84
protocol in a 40-km Sagnac loop setup continuously for one hour
and the measured QBER remained within the 2%∼5% range. A
further advantage of our scheme is that both phase and amplitude
modulation can be achieved simultaneously by frequency and
amplitude modulation of the AOM’s driving signal, allowing our
QKD system the capability of implementing other protocols, such
as the decoy-state QKD and the continuous-variable QKD. We
also briefly discuss a new type of Eavesdropping strategy (“phase-
remapping” attack) in bidirectional QKD system.
I. INTRODUCTION
One important practical application of quantum information
is quantum key distribution (QKD), whose unconditional se-
curity is based on the fundamental law of quantum mechanics
[1-6]. In principle, any eavesdropping attempt by a third party
(Eve) will unavoidably introduce quantum bit errors, so, it’s
possible for the legitimate users (Alice and Bob) to upper
bound the amount of information acquired by the eavesdropper
from some system parameters and the measured quantum
bit error rate (QBER). Alice and Bob can then distill out a
final secure key by performing error correction and privacy
amplification. Because Alice and Bob can’t distinguish the
intrinsic QBER due to imperfections in a practical QKD
system from the one induced by Eve, to guarantee the un-
conditional security, they have to assume all errors originate
from eavesdropping. Obviously, the QKD system with higher
intrinsic QBER will yield a lower secure key rate. As the
QBER reaches some threshold, QKD is not unconditional
secure anymore.
In a practical phase-coding QKD system, Alice and Bob
achieve phase encoding/decoding with phase modulators (PM)
and Mach Zehnder interferometers (MZI) [7-8]. However,
there are a few practical difficulties if QKD is to be im-
plemented over long distance through fiber: namely, phase
and polarization instabilities. In this case, the intrinsic QBER
induced by the imperfect interference can be described as [2]
QBER = (1− V)/2 (1)
where V is the interference visibility.
Although promising progresses have been achieved by using
active feedback control to stabilize the interferometer [8], the
“plug & play” auto-compensating QKD structure employing
a Faraday mirror has demonstrated higher performance in
practice [9]. Like the “plug & play” system, the Sagnac loop
also offers phase stability and polarization stability, as the
two interfering signals travel through the same path, but its
structure is in principle much simpler than the “plug & play”
scheme [10-13]. However, all reported Sagnac QKD systems
employed polarization-sensitive phase modulators, requiring
complicated polarization controls, which makes this scheme
unattractive. For example, four polarization controllers were
employed in [12], and the interference visibility for a 5 km
fiber loop was only 87%.
In this paper, we present a design for an AOM-based
polarization-insensitive phase modulation scheme together
with a Sagnac QKD system, and demonstrate stable QKD
operation over one hour without feedback control. Although
this system is designed for the BB84 protocol [1], with a
few straightforward modifications, it can also be adapted to
implement other protocols, such as the decoy state QKD [14-
20] and the continuous variable QKD [21].
II. AOM-BASED PHASE MODULATOR AND BIDIRECTIONAL
SAGNAC QKD SYSTEM
As two light pulses with a fixed time delay pass though
a frequency shift element, a relative phase shift is introduced
between the two pulses, which is determined by the amount of
frequency shift. So, by modulating the frequency shift, phase
modulation can be achieved. This is the basics principle of our
phase modulation scheme.
Fig. 1a shows the basic structure of this novel phase mod-
ulator, which consists of an acousto-optic modulator (AOM),
followed by a fiber with length L. For the first-order diffracted
light, the AOM will introduce a frequency shift equal to its
driving frequency f (due to the Doppler effect). The phase of
the diffracted light is also shifted by an amount of φ(t) , which
is the phase of acoustic wave at the time of diffraction [22].
Assuming two light pulses, S1 and S2, are in phase and are
sent to the phase modulator at the same time from opposite
directions as shown in Fig. 1a. They will reach the AOM at
different times with a time difference t2 − t1 = nL/C. Here
n is effective index of fiber and C is the speed of light in
vacuum. The phase difference between S1 and S2 after they
go through the phase modulator will be
∆φ = φ(t2)− φ(t1) = 2pif(t2 − t1) = 2pinLf/C (2)
Fig. 1. a) A phase modulator with one frequency up-shifter; b) A phase
modulator with a pair of frequency shifters. +: up-shifting AOM, -: down-
shifting AOM, L: fiber with length L, D: AOM driver
By modulating AOM’s driving frequency f , the relative
phase between S1 and S2 can be modulated. We remark
that the frequency of light will be up-shifted by this phase
modulator by an amount f . To remove this “side-effect”, we
can add another frequency down shifter at the other end of the
fiber, as shown in Fig.1b. In Fig.1b, the two AOMs, which are
driven by the same driver, will shift the frequency of light by
the same amount but with different signs. So the net frequency
shift will be zero. Since a down-shift AOM will shift the phase
of the diffracted light by −φ(t), the resulting phase difference
between S2 and S1 after they go through the phase modulator
will be
∆φ = φS2 − φS1 = 4pinLf/C (3)
Compared with the LiNbO3 waveguide-based phase mod-
ulator, the AOM-based phase modulator we proposed can be
designed to be insensitive to the polarization state of the
input light. This could dramatically simplify the design of
many QKD systems. As shown in (2) and (3), the phase
delay is determined by the acoustic frequency f , which can
be controlled very precisely (1ppm frequency resolution is
quite common). This implies that a high resolution phase
modulation can be achieved with our design. As a comparison,
the resolution of LiNbO3 phase modulator is in the order of
1%.
We have proposed a Sagnac QKD system employing this
novel phase modulator, as shown in Fig.2. To realize the
BB84 protocol, Alice randomly encodes the relative phase
between the clockwise and counterclockwise light pulses with
the AOM-based phase modulator PM1, while Bob randomly
chooses his measurement basis with phase modulator PM2. In
Alice’s side, two classical photo detectors (PD1, PD2) and two
wavelength filters (F1, F2) are introduced to counter Trojan
horse attack. These photo detectors could also be used for
synchronization purpose.
We remark the transmittance of AOM can also be modulated
by modulating the amplitude of its driving signal, so, the same
device can function as an amplitude modulator as well as a
phase modulator. (We remark that the newly developed decoy-
state QKD protocol [14-20], which improves the secure key
generation rate of practical QKD system dramatically, can be
easily realized in our proposed setup. In decoy-state QKD,
Alice randomly adds decoy pulses, which are used for testing
the communication channel, into the signal pulses for key
distribution. The decoy pulses are identical to the signal pulses
except for the average photon number. In the first experimental
demonstration of the decoy QKD [20], we added an external
AOM into a “plug & play” system to randomly modulate the
amplitude of each laser pulse according to a random profile.
Because the phase modulator we proposed can also function
as an amplitude modulator, our proposed QKD system can
implement decoy state protocol easily: Alice can achieve phase
modulation by modulating the frequency of the AOM driving
signal, at the same time, she can also modulate the intensity of
each pulse by modulating the amplitude of the driving signal.)
Fig. 2. Proposed QKD system: LD-pulsed laser diode; Cir-circulator;
C-2x2 coupler; PC-polarization controller; F1,F2-optical filter; PD1, PD2-
classical photo detector; PM1, PM2- AOM-based phase modulator (as shown
in Fig.1b); SPD1, SPD2-Single Photon detector
We remark, by introducing asymmetrical attenuation in the
fiber loop (for example, fiber isolators) and replacing the
SPDs with homodyne detector, continuous variable QKD [21]
could be implemented with the proposed system: here, Alice
can randomly modulates the amplitude quadrature and phase
quadrature with PM1, while Bob chooses which quadrature to
measure with PM2.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS WITH A SIMPLIFIED SYSTEM
To demonstrate the feasibility of our design, we have per-
formed experiments with a simplified version of our proposed
system shown in Fig.3. Here, only Alice holds a phase modu-
lator, while Bob always chooses the same measurement basis.
Strictly speaking, no genuine secret key can be distributed
by this simplified system, but it allows us to evaluate the
performance of a fully developed system (as shown in Fig.2)
in terms of stability and quantum bit error rate (QBER). In
Fig.3, the cw output from a 1550nm laser (L) is modulated by
an amplitude modulator (AM) to generate 500ps laser pulses.
Each laser pulse is split into S1 and S2 at a symmetric fiber
coupler, which go through a long fiber loop (L1+L2 ≈ 40km)
in the clockwise and counterclockwise directions, respectively.
The interference patterns at Ch1 and Ch2 are measured by two
InGaAs single photon detectors (SPD, Id Quantique, id200),
which work in gated mode. For a 5ns gating window, the
overall detection efficiency is ∼10% and the dark count prob-
ability is 5× 10−5per gating window. A fiber-pigtailed AOM
(Brimrose inc.) is placed inside the fiber loop asymmetrically
(L1−L2 ≈ 700m). Due to this asymmetry, phase modulation
between S1 and S2 can be achieved by modulating AOM’s
driving frequency, similar to the phase modulator shown in
Fig.1a. Because of the birefringence in the fiber loop, the
polarization states of S1 and S2 could be different after they
go through the fiber loop [23]. This is compensated by a
polarization controller (PC). The synchronization is achieved
as follows: A pulse generator (PG), which is triggered by
a function generator (FG1), drives the amplitude modulator
(AM) to produce 500ps laser pulses. FG1 also triggers a delay
generator (DG, Stanford research system, DG535), which in
turn produces two gating signals for SPD1 and SPD2, and
one trigger signal for a data acquisition card (NI, PCI-6115).
The AOM is driven by another function generator FG2, whose
frequency is controlled by the data acquisition card.
Fig. 3. Experimental setup: L-1550nm cw laser; AM-amplitude modulator;
Att-attenuator; Cir-circulator; C-2x2 coupler; PC-polarization controller; FG1,
FG2-function generator; PG-Pulse generator; DG-Delay generator; SPD1,
SPD2-Single Photon detector
We measured the interference visibility by scanning the
frequency of FG2 while recoding the outputs from the two
SPDs. The average photon number per pulse (out from Alice’s
side) was set to be 0.8, which matched with signal photon
level in a decoy state QKD system [19-20]. The measured
interference visibility for a 40km and a 10km fiber loop was
96% and 99% respectively.
To run the BB84 protocol, a random number file (1Kbits)
is preloaded to the buffer of the data acquisition card. This
random file contains a sequence of four discrete values cor-
responding to the four phase values in the BB84 protocol {0,
pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}. Once triggered, the data acquisition card reads
out a value from the random file and sends it to FG2 to encode
Alice’s phase information. The data acquisition card also
samples the outputs from SPDs (Bob’s measurement results)
into its input buffer. In this preliminary setup, Bob always uses
the same basis for his measurement. After transmitting 100K
bits, Alice and Bob can estimate the QBER by comparing the
data contained in Alice’s random file and Bob’s measurement
results. We ran the system continuously for one hour without
any adjustment, the QBER drifted slowly from 2% to 5%, as
shown in Fig.4. In practice, to improve the long-term stability,
simple recalibration process can be employed, as in other QKD
systems. During this experiment, the pulse repetition rate was
set to 1 KHz for easy synchronization.
Fig. 4. Measured QBER in one hour without any feedback control. The
photon level is 0.8photon/pulse (The error bars indicate the statistic fluctuation
due to the finite detection events)
For a typical AOM, its frequency modulation rate is in the
range of 1∼10MHz, which is compatible with the operation
rate of today’s QKD system. The ultimate operating rate of
our phase modulation scheme was tested by running FG2 in
Frequency-Shift Keying mode: its frequency hopped between
two values (corresponds to 0 or pi phase delay) at 100 KHz
rate. Note in this case, the equivalent phase-encoding rate was
200 KHz. Here, strong, cw laser was input to the system,
and interference signal from Ch1 was detected with a photo
detector. Fig.5 shows the experimental result, where the sharp
rising edge (∼500ns) indicates a potential phase modulation
rate of a few MHz could be achievable.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In a bidirectional QKD system, such as the “plug & play”
system as well as the system we propose here, Alice allows
signals to go in and out of her device, this opens a potential
backdoor for Eve to launch various Trojan horse attacks. In
our simplified setup, where only one AOM is used in Alice’s
side as a phase modulator, the frequency of the laser pulse
Fig. 5. The experimental results at 200 KHz Phase modulation rate. The
sharp rising edge (∼500ns) indicates a potential phase modulation rate of a
few MHz could be achievable.
output from Alice depends on the encoded phase information
(due to the frequency shift induced by the AOM). This may
leak additional information to Eve and a naive application
of the unconditionally secure proof of BB84 to our current
experimental set-up is invalid.
In the standard BB84 protocol, Alice encodes phase in-
formation {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} by modulating the AOM at
frequency {f0, f0+∆f , f0+2∆f , f0+3∆f}. From (2), the
encoded phase depends on both the AOM’s driving frequency
f and the fiber length difference ∆L. In principle, Eve can
build up a device with different fiber length, breaks into the
communication channel, and plays the “intercept and resend”
attack. Suppose Eve uses her device to send laser pulses to
Alice. Unaware that the pulses are from Eve, Alice will still
shift the frequency of light by one of the values {f0, f0+∆f ,
f0 + 2∆f , f0 + 3∆f}. By choosing a suitable fiber length
difference, Eve can re-mapping the encoded phase from {0,
pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} to {0,δ, 2δ, 3δ}, where δ is under Eve’s control.
In [24], we describe detail of this “phase-remapping attack”
and proved that Eve can learn the full information of the final
key at the cost of introducing a 14.6% QBER. Note that this
number is substantially lower than the proved secure bound of
18.9% for the standard BB84 protocol [25]. We remark that
this loophole can be closed by employing the phase modulator
shown in Fig.1b, which introduces no frequency shift (as the
setup in Fig.2).
In conclusion, we propose a polarization-insensitive phase
modulation scheme and a stable Sagnac QKD system em-
ploying this technique. Compared with previous Sagnac QKD
schemes based on polarization-sensitive phase modulators, our
proposed system demonstrated better performance over longer
fiber. Preliminary experimental results showed an interference
visibility of 96% (99%) for a 40km (10km) fiber loop at
single photon level. With this novel polarization-insensitive
phase modulation scheme, we expect the performance of many
practical QKD systems can be greatly improved.
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